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Abstract 
Background: This paper is based on an address given as joint winner with Ronald V. Clarke of the 2015 Stockholm 
Prize in Criminology. This was awarded for some early studies we worked on together in the UK Home Office which 
were seen as important in re-focusing the task of preventing crime towards simply reducing opportunities for it. This 
approach became known as situational crime prevention. It had a hostile academic reception from academic crimi-
nologists and earned the label of ‘administrative criminology’. Later, the same label was given to what was portrayed 
as narrow, unscholarly research done for government to serve their political agenda, in contrast to research with more 
range and theoretical thrust. Administrative criminology is a term most familiar in relation to UK research supported 
by its government; this is the paper’s context.
Discussion: Administrative criminology deserves a much more positive appraisal than it has been given to date. First, 
government research activity through to the 1990s at least was self-generated (not imposed), was influential, and was 
often controversial. The research establishing situational crime prevention as a generally effective approach has with-
stood criticism that it lacks intellectual weight and would not work. Second, administrative criminologists have been 
consistently brought to heel as regards ensuring that they communicate what they know effectively and clearly. Third, 
administrative criminology has arguably had more influence on policy than academic criminology, since its business 
is to address the concerns of government to which it is better placed to make its voice heard. Finally, administrative 
criminology should be credited for keeping the ‘criminological ball rolling’ insofar as it provides a wealth of data from 
expensive surveys on victimisation and offending, as well as basic ‘facts and figures’ from statistical series on crime and 
the criminal justice system. These data serve criminologists of all complexions.
Summary: This paper discusses the two fronts on which administrative criminology has been criticised. It defends 
its record on both fronts. It also argues that critics overlook the contribution that administrative criminology makes to 
supplying much of the basic empirical data on which all criminologists draw.
Keywords: Administrative criminology, Situational crime prevention, Home Office research, British crime Survey, 
Crime reduction programme
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Background
This paper is based on the address I gave on receiving the 
2015 Stockholm Prize in Criminology, awarded jointly 
with Ronald V. Clarke (School of Criminal Justice, Rut-
gers University). The prize recognised a series of studies 
on which we worked together in the 1970s and 1980s in 
the UK Home Office.1 These were seen as important in 
re-focusing the task of preventing crime towards reduc-
ing and manipulating opportunities for it, rather than 
trying to change people’s disposition to offend, or reform 1 Until 2007, the Home Office had an amalgam of responsibilities, which 
included policing, the penal system, and the criminal law—but not the courts 
and the judiciary. In 2007, the Home Office was split into two with a new 
Ministry of Justice subsuming the Departmental of Constitutional Affairs to 
take responsibility for prisons, probation and sentencing. The Home Office 
now deals with crime, policing, terrorism, security and immigration.
known offenders. These studies formed the basis of what 
became known as situational crime prevention (SCP)—
an approach that first attracted the label ‘administrative 
criminology’. The term now, though, is more widely used 
to cover what is seen as atheoretical, narrowly focussed 
research done within or for government within tight con-
fines of the current political agenda. This paper mounts a 
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defence of administrative criminology in both guises. It 
also argues for a widening of the concept of administra-
tive criminology.
Administrative criminology may be a term unfamiliar to 
many readers. It may be recognised by others who, while 
they have no clear sense of its meaning, are cognisant that 
it is nearly always referred to negatively. It is most often 
used in the UK, and my defence of administrative crimi-
nology is thus set in a UK context.2 I mount my defence as 
someone who sees herself as a quintessential administra-
tive criminologist. Most of my career was as a Home 
Office researcher, but three periods of work elsewhere 
were all in essentially administrative criminology environ-
ments: in the late 1980s at the National Institute of Justice 
(NIJ), the research arm of the US Department of Justice; 
between 2001 and 2003 at the Australian Institute of 
Criminology (a statutory authority geared to undertaking 
and communicating evidence-based research); and 
between 2004 and 2008 at Victoria University of Welling-
ton in New Zealand where I headed the Crime and Justice 
Research Centre which did applied research under grants 
largely from government departments or the police.
As said, the term administrative criminology was first 
attached to SCP, which was chastised, amongst other 
things, as wilfully ignoring the ‘root causes’ of crime. 
The term was first coined by Jock Young in a 1986 essay 
(Young 1986). He skirted a definition of administrative 
criminology, talking instead about a reconstitution of 
‘establishment’ criminology in the USA and particularly 
within the Home Office. Young certainly singled out Ron 
Clarke, but it was later textbooks that explicitly defined 
administrative criminology as being SCP and the ‘rational 
choice’ theory that Clarke developed alongside it (see, 
for example, McLaughlin 2006; Tierney 2009). As said, 
though, administrative criminology has now lost its moor-
ing to SCP. For its critics now, it is seen as Hirschi (1993) 
describes it: a poor specimen of research and thinking 
consistent with requirements of government bureaucrats.
In this paper I take up first the development of SCP in 
the mid-1970s in the Home Office Research Unit, as well 
as other work that transformed thinking about the deliv-
ery of crime prevention. The examples taken here are 
policing research and the British Crime Survey.3 I will 
then look at changes that altered the complexion of 
administrative criminology, and the nature of the new 
criticisms against it. Changing tack a little, I then touch 
on some matters to do with research communication and 
2 Strictly speaking, I am talking about England and Wales, but ‘UK’ is sim-
pler. Scotland and Northern Ireland had their own, smaller research capa-
bilities. I would imagine much of what I say would apply across the borders.
3 The BCS was renamed the Crime Survey for England and Wales in 2012 
when management of the survey transferred from the Home Office to the 
Office of National Statistics. I will use BCS for old times’ sake however.
influence, and how I see administrative criminology as 
fitting in here.
I propose that administrative criminology deserves a 
much more positive appraisal than it has been given to 
date. To anticipate what follows, SCP (and much other 
government research activity in the UK in the 1960s 
through to the 1990s) was largely self-generated rather 
than imposed; it was influential and often controversial. 
In-house government researchers were competent (testi-
fied by the fact that many now hold several of the senior 
academic posts in universities), and were happy to priori-
tise the task of informing policy over that of extending 
esoteric academic debate. They were also brought to heel 
as regards ensuring that what they knew was effectively 
and clearly communicated. After the turn of the century, 
a number of changes in the organisation of research in 
the Home Office, including control of the research 
budget being moved from researchers to policy divisions, 
substantially increased the influence the policy centre 
had on the nature of research to be supported, and weak-
ened professional links between in-house researchers 
and outside academics. Relationships were also fractured 
by the burden of evaluating the huge, ill-fated 1999 Crime 
Reduction Programme. Further strains came from having 
research resources diverted to simply measuring whether 
targets imposed by Performance Management were 
being met. However, I will argue that any recent ‘watering 
down’ of administrative criminology says more about 
increasing managerialism and accountability at the policy 
centre than what can be delivered in a more benign 
research environment. Finally, I suggest that administra-
tive criminology should be credited for work that ‘keeps 
the criminological ball rolling’ in other ways. For 
instance, it provides important knowledge from expen-
sive, government-funded data-gathering exercises such 
as victimisation or offender surveys. I also see it as 
encompassing the collection of essential routine adminis-
trative, statistical data (the number of people arrested, 
the number taken to court, etc.), which critics of admin-
istrative criminology seem to put in the firing line along-
side research under an administrative criminology 
banner.4
The Home Office Research Unit
Ron Clarke and I joined the Home Office Research Unit 
in the late 1960s as it was growing into the biggest centre 
of criminological research in the UK, both in terms of the 
research it did itself and which it funded. It had a strong 
international reputation. The Unit had substantial control 
4 In the UK, statistical series are delivered alongside research. Arrange-
ments may differ elsewhere, with different agencies involved—but still serv-
ing government.
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over both the internal and external research programme. 
As a ‘standalone’ unit, its researchers saw themselves as 
rather distant from policy; Hough (2014: 218) described 
us as “rather reluctant civil servants”. Any notion that 
we were administrative lackeys is rather misplaced. On 
the whole, there was a healthy professional relationship 
between us in our concrete towers and outside academ-
ics in their ivory ones. (They were, of course, conscious 
of the fact that we held the strings of a large purse.) Good 
relationships were helped by a commitment to publica-
tion, and the fact that the Home Office Research Pro-
gramme was published, and academics were brought into 
comment on it.
The late 1970s, however, saw a fracturing of the crimi-
nological community. On one side were the traditional 
‘positivists’ that government criminologists were seen 
to represent and favour. Poles apart were the emergent 
radical criminologists who wanted to reframe the crime 
control debate entirely—in particular to look at its soci-
ological and political underpinnings (e.g., Taylor et  al. 
1973). It was mainly from within these ranks that the first 
assault on administrative criminology was mounted.
The development of situational crime prevention
Much research in the Home Office when Ron Clarke and 
I joined it was about the causes of offending, and the 
effectiveness of different interventions in rehabilitating 
offenders. Clarke strongly disagreed with the notion that 
some people are simply ‘disposed’ to criminality—
through genetics, personality, or poor upbringing (for an 
early discussion, see Clarke 1980). Nor did he think that 
looking at different criminal sanctions was fruitful. 
Clarke was not entirely on his own. The message coming 
from North America was that ‘nothing works’ (Martin-
son 1974). In the Research Unit, a report on the effective-
ness of sentencing reached the same conclusion (Brody 
1976). This was a serious ‘wobble’, leaving a policy vac-
uum that some other approach could potentially fill. SCP 
was a contender.5 It distinguished itself from ‘social’ pre-
vention’ aimed at addressing possible criminogenic fac-
tors such as poverty, unemployment, or poor education. 
What it was interested in basically was not why people 
offended, but the situations in which they offended, and 
how these situations could be acted upon to increase the 
risks and reduce the gains. An underlying principle was 
that situational measures needed to be directed at 
5 Actually, Ron Clarke lays no claim to inventing the terms situational crime 
prevention. We think it was invented by a policy unit in the late 1970  s. 
Before that, the term used was ‘physical’ crime prevention—for instance, in 
Crime as Opportunity (Mayhew et al. 1976). It was also sometimes called 
‘environmental’ crime prevention.
specific forms of crime based on a thorough understand-
ing of the circumstances that encouraged them.
Looking back, some of the first SCP studies con-
cerned with assessing the role of opportunity and situ-
ation in crime seem rather ‘quaint’. (For example, one 
study looked at the effect of motorcycle helmet legisla-
tion on motorcycle theft; another at whether the intro-
duction of steering column locks reduced theft of cars; 
another at how having conductors on buses influenced 
where vandalism occurred on the bus). However, there 
have been many more subsequent studies, and the initial 
typology of eight SCP measures has now expanded to 25 
(see Cornish and Clarke 2003). A few of the subsequent 
studies were done in the Home Office after Ron Clarke 
left, although SCP work in the UK has now mainly been 
incorporated into the ‘crime science’ promoted by Jill 
Dando Institute (see Tilley and Laycock 2007)—the new 
bête noire for academic criminologists.
Reactions
The early SCP work played to a sceptical government 
audience who did not much care for Clarke’s rationale 
that situational factors in crime commission were emi-
nently more manipulable than social factors and that we 
should simply look at these.6 Outside academics were 
negative too. They saw the government as turning to SCP 
as a last resort—ignoring the fact that government was 
yet to be convinced. Wortley (2010) lists the criticisms of 
SCP: it was simplistic; it ignored underlying social and 
cultural causes of crime; it lacked theoretical sophistica-
tion; it would merely displace crime in time, place or 
form; it assumed offenders were rational actors; and it 
would lead to a ‘fortress society’. The criticisms came 
from several fronts, though most vocally from the more 
radical criminologists. All the criticisms have been 
robustly challenged (see, for example, Clarke 2005), and 
that rebuttal is not my concern here. Rather, I move onto 
the next developments to argue that it was criminology 
done and funded by government, rather than that coming 
from elsewhere that exerted most influence. I will focus 
briefly on: (i) the British Crime Survey; and (ii) the devel-
opment of policing research.
The British Crime Survey
As said, I put large-scale victimisation and self-reported 
offending surveys firmly under the banner of administra-
tive criminology, and Matthews (2014) had the British 
Crime Survey (BCS) clearly in his sights. The first sweep 
6 In the US, James Q. Wilson was the devil incarnate. Thinking about Crime 
(Wilson 1975) argued much the same case, with particular emphasis put on 
more effective modes of policing.
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of the BCS was in 1982, by which time the Research Unit 
had become the Research and Planning Unit (RPU). The 
survey was a substantial administrative criminology pro-
ject in its own right. It was sold by researchers to policy 
divisions who were not enthusiastic in the early days. It 
aligned with SCP interests in various ways. For one, it 
showed the crime problem as it actually affected house-
holders rather than as documented in police-recorded 
crime. Second, it identified the important phenomenon 
of repeat victimisation, which generated a number of 
studies in the SCP mould. Third, it tracked how targets 
of theft changed over time, showing how simple availabil-
ity and desirability of targets could determine crime pat-
terns. Fourth, it revealed just how much ordinary crime 
stays beyond the reach of the criminal justice system, 
by not being reported to the police, by not always being 
recorded by them, by not being cleared up, etc. At the 
same time, the BCS also showed how risks of victimisa-
tion varied in ways that implicated social and economic 
factors—so not quite on the SCP agenda.
The BCS has now run now for over 30 years (see Hough 
and Maxfield 2007 for a discussion). Let me just highlight 
the fact that the survey has provided—out of the admin-
istrative criminology stable—a wealth of data on the 
nature, level and distribution of victimisation risk, as well 
as on a huge range of other crime-related topics. These 
data can serve a diverse set of criminological interests, 
and we encouraged and funded the use of the survey for 
these.
Policing research
In the early 1980s, Ron Clarke started a number of stud-
ies of the police which bought more ‘bad news’, seriously 
challenging the value of traditional policing and simply 
putting ‘more police on the ground’ (Clarke and Hough 
1980, 1984). This led Clarke to promote what he called 
‘situational policing’. This was akin to problem-oriented 
policing being developed by Herman Goldstein in the US 
at same time to sharpen police practices in relation to 
specific forms of crime, using more analytic and focussed 
thinking. As those in the UK tended to be rather over-
awed by American developments, situational policing got 
a bit of a wind behind it. Research was taken forward 
most actively by researchers in a new Crime Prevention 
Unit set up within the Police Department in the early 
1980s, which later became the Police Research Group, 
headed by Gloria Laycock.7 These administrative crimi-
7 Policing research continued to an extent in RPU itself after Ron left 
in 1984. The PRG was closed down in 2002, as research resources were 
‘streamlined’. Later, policing research in the Home Office emerged actively 
again but largely with an emphasis on improving confidence in the police, 
through ‘reassurance’ and neighbourhood policing for instance.
nologists produced an impressive amount of influential 
research.
Change in the delivery of crime prevention
Various research strands, then, had brought rather 
unwelcome news, showing the limits of traditional polic-
ing, and the small number of offenders captured by the 
criminal justice system, which did not do very well in 
preventing re-offending anyway. An important outcome 
of this was to cement the idea that to reduce crime one 
needed to look beyond sanctions and to share the burden 
of prevention between the police, local agencies, busi-
nesses and the public—all working in partnership.8
Without dwelling on the series of important develop-
ments (some placed in statute) to which this change of 
thinking led, suffice it to say just two things. First, the job 
of monitoring partnership working—which was by no 
means easy—fell largely to those servicing administrative 
criminology in the Home Office (see, for example, Liddle 
and Gelsthorpe 1994; Sutton 1995). Second, by the turn 
of the century, SCP and ‘designing out crime’ were ideas 
that thoroughly permeated the work of the new ‘commu-
nity safety’ partnerships.
Other work
I should not give the impression that it was only policing 
work and the BCS that was going on. There was an eclec-
tic programme of other work. Research continued on the 
operation and effects of different sanctions; race and crime 
began to merge as an issue, as did drugs and crime. There 
were other surveys started—for instance, the first sweep 
of the Commercial Victimisation Survey was in 1994, 
the Youth Lifestyles Survey started a year earlier, and the 
offending, crime and justice survey started in 2003.
Moreover, the Home Office was managing a variety of 
statistical series. The largest of these related to police-
recorded crime, and sentencing outcomes. But there 
were others (for instance, on the prison population, 
reconviction rates, complaints against the police, drug 
seizures and drug offenders, and motoring offences). All 
this was administrative criminology; and it was of course 
empirical fodder for criminologists in all their different 
stripes.
To sum up so far, then, government research activity 
in the UK in the 1960s through to the 1990s was large in 
scale, vibrant, and influential. It was largely self-gener-
ated by Home Office researchers rather than imposed on 
them. It was also often controversial, by no means always 
8 Garland (1996) has a useful discussion of how this adaptive strategy of 
‘responsibilization’ took firm hold in UK government policy, influenced by 
the tenets of SCP.
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saying what government would want to hear. SCP was 
not a government ‘sticking plaster’, but a new research-
inspired way of thinking about reducing crime—one that 
initially produced a rather sceptical official response, and 
certainly a negative one from many academics. It has 
since become entirely accepted. Home Office research 
on policing was instrumental, and the BCS marked an 
empirical breakthrough. In the background, as well, was a 
substantial amount of other research activity, being done 
in-house or with government support. I contend that this 
was a good record for administrative criminology.
Changing times
I move on now to consider how various things changed 
which in time led to a new wave of hostility towards 
administrative criminology. This was both in terms of 
what it was seen as doing, and how it was seen to be 
doing it.
Politically, with the Conservatives in power since 
1979, the Right and Left were outbidding each other to 
be tough on crime. A new Conservative Home Secretary 
(Sir Michael Howard) took up the reins in 1992, believing 
that ‘prison works’, and not much taken with the research 
advice he was being given (Windlesham 1996). What was 
now the Research, Development and Statistics Direc-
torate (RDS) came under threat, and many experienced 
research staff moved to Universities.
The 1990s, too, saw the emergence of performance 
management and the setting of a multitude of targets for 
central and local government agencies relating to crime 
and criminal justice. [The same trend was evident over-
seas, but Performance Management in the UK seemed 
to be particularly vigorous. It was also distinctive in 
being government-mandated and officially monitored 
(see Hood 2007)]. One result of Performance Manage-
ment was that much research capacity was directed 
towards supplying Performance Indicators to measure 
progress against targets. The BCS certainly changed as 
a result, becoming burdened with tracking levels of fear 
of crime, satisfaction with the police, and confidence in 
the criminal justice system for instance. This restricted 
the scope for the survey to pursue new topics and the-
oretical lines of enquiry as was the case earlier on (see 
Hough et  al. 2007). Crucially, too, RDS came to lose 
control of the research budget, which had involved it 
in assessing competing external bids for funds. Instead, 
control of the research budget was handed out to pol-
icy and implementation teams for them to decide how 
it was to be spent. Tarling (2011) stresses how big a 
change this was for relationships between administrative 
criminologists and outside academics, and for the influ-
ence that the policy centre had on the nature of research 
commissioned.
Crime Reduction Programme
New Labour had come to power in 1997, and liberal 
criminologists hoped for the best. But Performance Man-
agement, if anything, accelerated. Moreover, under a 
Modernisation programme, civil servants were held 
accountable for the delivery and outcomes of policies 
they cared to suggest; and these—critically—were meant 
to be firmly based on evidence (Wiles 2002). So came 
about the 1999 Crime Reduction Programme (CRP), 
described as the most ambitious and innovative pro-
gramme for tackling crime so far attempted (Homel et al. 
2004: v). Based on a stocktake of what we knew about 
reducing crime (Goldblatt and Lewis 1998) the CRP was 
given five thrusts; two of these, it can be noted, were 
geared towards SCP; another was targeted policing.9 
These are the pointers, the government said: make your 
bids, but accept stringent evaluation to indicate what 
offers best value for money. From a large £250 m budget 
for the first 3 years, 10 % was earmarked for evaluation, 
which was largely carried out by a consortia of outside 
academics (many of them in fact ex-government 
researchers whom Universities had been happy to 
employ).
So, the CRP was a golden goose; the country almost 
literally ran out of criminologists with evaluation skills. 
Morgan and Hough (2007) judge that some were excited 
to be part of the exercise, some no doubt simply tempted 
by what the money meant for them and their employers. 
The achievements of the CRP, however, are considered 
dismal (see, e.g., Tonry 2010). What was to be a ten-year 
initiative was abandoned after three, with relatively few 
results to show for it. A central point here, though, is that 
the programme of research left bad feelings on the part 
of both the evaluators and their paymasters (cf. Newburn 
2011). The former resented the heavy hand of the centre, 
moving goal posts, and apparent massaging of results in 
summary, low-key publications. (Some outside academ-
ics subsequently became wary of accepting government 
research contracts—although the need to raise money 
often overcame this.) The Home Office, for its part, felt 
disappointed by reports with inconclusive results (even 
if this was due to the fact that few projects were imple-
mented as planned). This tempered faith in university-
based research, starting a trend towards using private 
9 Goldblatt and Lewis (1998), drew in part on work recently published by 
Sherman et  al. (1997). One of the two SCP thrusts was tackling high vol-
ume crime such as domestic burglary, where a key theme was to develop 
local infrastructure and skills to identify the nature of different problems. 
The other was the development of products and systems that are resistant 
to crime, which went under the ‘Foresight’ programme. The Goldblatt and 
Lewis report countered the ‘nothing works’ mantra as regards penal sanc-
tions and rehabilitative treatment (especially cognitive behaviour therapy); 
early intervention for young at-risk children was also recommended.
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sector consultants and contractors. It has been argued 
that this development, in the UK and elsewhere, under-
mined criminology’s broader intellectual integrity and 
academic prestige (Chancer and McLaughlin 2007).
So, is there a defence of administrative criminology at 
this point? Well, the failure of the CRP, I would argue, 
was less to do with administrative criminology per se 
than with endemic problems at the centre and the harsh 
realities of programme development and rollout. Thus, 
as Maguire (2004) has documented, there were infeasi-
ble timescales, substantial implementation failure, and 
low commitment to project integrity on the ground. The 
need for the policy centres to meet the crime reduction 
targets of the time also meant that this took priority over 
encouraging and helping administrative criminologists 
improve the evidence base.
New challenges to administrative criminology
The demise of the CRP was part of new wave of hostil-
ity to administrative criminology. As said, it came to be 
seen as a type of narrow research done within or for gov-
ernment (or state agencies) within the tight margins of 
the current political agenda—which was usually felt to 
be wrong-headed anyway. In 2007, Morgan and Hough 
characterised the current view of Home Office adminis-
trative criminology.
“It is widely contended, and not just by radical out-
siders, that most Home Office-funded research is: 
almost entirely atheoretical fact gathering […]; nar-
rowly focussed – generally on a recent spending or 
administrative initiative or piece of legislation; and 
designed to be, and in its final product invariably is, 
policy-friendly” (Morgan and Hough 2007: 54).
It is incumbent on me to respond. In relation to fact 
gathering, I will be robust. In my view, it is entirely defen-
sible to gather facts to judge what is going on and to be 
able to impart this to others. Moreover, as said, facts are 
empirical fodder for all criminologists to use as they 
chose fit.10 Has administrative criminology become too 
narrowly focussed on programme evaluation? That may 
well be true, although my reckoning is that this is a con-
sequence of increasing managerialism and accountability 
which cemented the idea that criminology’s key role was 
to produce evidence to underpin the recommendations 
of policymakers. Moreover, it is arguable that different 
10 In The Criminological Imagination, Jock Young (2011) challenged the 
focus on quantification. He argued for criminology to go back to its creative 
and critical roots, eschewing quantitative research altogether. He has been 
widely challenged on this front (e.g., Currie 2012). (There is no reference 
to administrative criminology in the index to the book, but it would clearly 
have been in his sights. Victimisation surveys are frequently mentioned).
pieces of narrowly focussed work will, with luck, eventu-
ally be pulled together to provide more substantial 
insights. Is administrative criminology designed to be 
policy friendly (cf. Walters 2007; Hope 2011)? While this 
is possibly the case, the reality is that research came to be 
commissioned by those working for political bosses, so it 
is understandable perhaps if they did not want to chal-
lenge too vigorously what their bosses wanted. Certainly, 
though, the demand for evaluative research to support 
policy can pose problems for researchers. Those inside 
government may be able fight their corner a bit better as 
regards moderating the tone of what is said about results. 
Generally speaking, those in the Home Office could in 
the past. Those in universities working under contact 
might be harder pushed, and fear that shouting too loud 
will jeopardise future work.
For my own part, I feel that some of the current unease 
about administrative criminology in the UK is that it has 
lost some academic weight—though I need to tread care-
fully here. The loss of control over the research budget 
may well be one factor—with researchers doing or 
(increasingly) contracting out work that others see as fit-
ting the bill. However, I would also make the case that in 
(let us call it) its heyday, administrative criminology was 
unusually vibrant academically. At that time, researchers 
were largely operating from within a single professional 
unit and supported by management which encouraged 
scholarship (cf. Tarling 2011). After 2004, all Home Office 
researchers were embedded within policy divisions.11 So, 
the management dynamics may have changed, with more 
of a focus on simple delivery than on good science, with 
arguably shorter-term priorities too (cf. Newburn 2011). 
It is hard to be sure about this, however. The model of 
criminologists being ‘embedded’ with practitioners and 
policy personnel has many supporters (see, e.g., Stanko 
2007; Petersilia 2008; Braga and Davis 2014). Moreover, 
as said, there was some very productive work achieved 
when some researchers were embedded within the Police 
Department in the Home Office in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Laycock and Clarke (2001), in comparing the influence of 
research on government crime prevention policy in the 
UK and the US, argue that Home Office research was a 
good deal more influential than that emanating from NIJ 
in the US. One reason for this was that NIJ was physically 
separate from the US Justice Department. This restricted 
informal contact between research and policy staff and 
led to NIJ operating in a more passive mode as regards 
providing information and contributing to knowledge.
11 In 2007, when a Ministry of Justice was hived off from the rest of the 
Home Office, RDS staff were spilt between the two, but largely remained 
embedded.
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Communication
A question I believe needs airing is how effectively crimi-
nologists put across what they know. This has arisen 
recently in the debates on both public criminology and 
translational criminology. Effective communication is a 
theme in each, and I see a link here with administrative 
criminology.
There has been much written recently on public crimi-
nology—or as it is sometimes rather confusingly called 
public criminologies (Uggen and Inderbitzin 2010). It was 
a term adopted in the US by Todd Clear in an address to 
the 2009 American Society of Criminology (Clear 2010). 
In the UK, it has been discussed most vocally by Loader 
and Sparks (2010a).12 I have struggled to find a clear, sin-
gle definition of public criminology, but my interpreta-
tion is that it calls for criminologists to upskill in how 
they deliver and sell their knowledge. This is to both to 
counteract the apparent declining relevance of criminol-
ogy, and to put the brakes on bad crime policies. ‘Cooling 
the heat’ is how it is put (Loader and Sparks 2010b). More 
effective communication is one element.
Translational criminology is a term probably best known 
in the USA. John Laub, a past Director of the National 
Institute of Justice, adopted translational criminology as 
his mood music (see Laub 2012), and its home is now the 
Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy at George Mason 
University in Washington.13 The principle tenets seem to 
be: (i) do rigorous research to inform policy (but of differ-
ent types); (ii) collaborate with practitioners and policy 
makers to understand how knowledge is translated by 
them; (iii) go into researcher/practitioner partnerships so 
that results have better shared ownership; and (iv) develop 
translation tools for better communication.
In the research environment of the Home Office, great 
emphasis was placed on the communication of research 
results. Much store was set by clear elucidation, plain 
language, contextualising, etc. (I am not saying we always 
got it right.) Moreover, a basic rule was that policy impli-
cations should be clearly spelt out. (In the early days, we 
sometimes struggled to get funded academics to do this, 
although over time they learned the ropes.) When much 
of the crime prevention research moved over to the 
12 Loader and Sparks lay out five types of criminological engagement, which 
they see as ‘scientific expert’, ‘policy advisor’, ‘observer turned player’, ‘social 
movement theorist/activist’, and ‘lonely prophet’. Administrative criminolo-
gists would fall most readily into the first two categories, although as a num-
ber of reviewers of the book have noted, the five types are not discrete, and 
one’s position can change over time and with circumstance.
13 The Centre was founded in 2008 and has four programmes of work: 
research on crime and place; evidence-based policing; evidence-based cor-
rections and treatment; and systematic reviews. David Weisburd, Executive 
Director of the CEBCP, won the Stockholm Prize in Criminology in 2010 
for his series of experiments showing that intensified police patrol at high 
crime ‘hot spots’ does not merely push crime around the corner.
Police Department, Gloria Laycock put even more effort 
into the mode and manner of publication. She instituted 
a number of publication series aimed at getting clear 
messages to the right audiences, which were with deliber-
ately marketed and disseminated to the police through 
carefully-selected police ‘champions’.14
It may be harsh to say that most of those outside the 
administrative criminology stable do less well with com-
munication. But in my view, this is mainly true. They 
write books to impress each other, which others will 
often fail to understand. They publish in scholarly jour-
nals with limited readership. And they have to abide by 
academic career structures and incentives that typically 
do not award points for writing for practitioners or mak-
ing their voices heard in the policy process (Tonry 2010).
Influence
If communicating research and knowledge effectively is 
essential for gaining influence, the question remains of 
how often is influence achieved. Many refer back to the 
liberal criminal justice climate of the 1950s and 1960s in 
the UK (e.g., Faulkner 2010). Then, a small criminologi-
cal elite had a voice at the policy table, which was largely 
insulated from the competing influences evident today: 
electoral politics, ideology, interest groups, the media, 
and the dreaded public opinion. More pessimistic crimi-
nologists now tend to think that it is an unequal battle.
For my purpose, though, the question is whether 
administrative criminology deserves a more severe rep-
rimand than other forms of criminology with respect 
to influencing policy. I do not think it does. For one, 
there are many examples of administrative criminol-
ogy research that has made a difference. It is telling that 
Loader and Sparks (2010a: 13), in discussing the influ-
ences of research on policy pick as their examples SCP, 
problem-oriented policing, and preventive interventions 
focused on risk and protective factors. [This last of course 
has a broad research base, but it includes the Home 
Office surveys of youth lifestyles and offending started 
in 1993 (Graham and Bowling 1995), as well as the 
14 The Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC), where I spent time 
between 2001 and 2003, was unashamedly into communication. A key per-
formance indicator was the number of publications it put out. There was 
great emphasis on readability, and all publications had prominent press 
releases. University academics contracted by AIC had to adhere to strict 
publication ‘house rules’, and I witnessed some of them finding this dif-
ficult. In my view, too, AIC research was lively and had breadth. Whilst I 
was there, there were reports on illicit markets in diamonds and antiqui-
ties; cargo theft; prosecuting serious fraud; and organised crime and people 
smuggling. Publications in 2015 included: corruption in Australian sport; 
human trafficking and slavery; offender views on the drop in property crime 
(offenders cite security, by the way); migrant sex workers; an evaluation 
of community justice; and ‘sexting’ among young people. These are topics 
which I think a wide audience would find interesting.
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Cambridge Study of Delinquent Development the begin-
nings of which were Home Office sponsored]. Moreover, 
it is hard to deny that the BCS has been a major contrib-
utor. Apart from the fact that it now challenges police-
recorded crime as the main indicator of crime trends, it 
was, for instance, a strong driver of policies to improve 
services for victims, and it identified the important phe-
nomenon of repeat victimisation, the reduction of which 
became a police performance indicator. It has also served 
to better quantify the extent of domestic violence, even if 
there is debate about how accurately it has done so (see 
Walby et al. 2016 for instance). Second, while the current 
charge is that administrative criminology is now too nar-
rowly focussed on single, specific initiatives etc., at least 
the evaluations are being done. They may not make much 
difference now, but one hopes that they could at least 
be pulled off the shelf and dusted down at some future 
point—not least to suggest which policies were most mis-
guided. Finally, as Tonry (2010) has observed, ‘windows 
of opportunity’ sometimes open through which new 
ideas can pass and influence policy shifts. It might be said 
that SCP benefited from such a window of opportunity, 
as did research on new methods of policing. Administra-
tive criminologists may be closer to that window.
Concluding remarks
I have discussed administrative criminology in the UK 
context, but I feel that those in other countries whose 
governments conduct and commission research on crime 
and justice issues and compile statistics on these will rec-
ognise it as a genre well enough. I have also discussed 
administrative criminology in the Home Office from the 
point of view of its research contribution to—broadly—
the crime prevention agenda, which I know best. Other 
areas of administrative criminology will have made their 
own contributions, as testified by the Goldblatt and 
Lewis (1998) stocktake of evidence identifying the most 
promising avenues of crime control.
In preparing my defence of administrative criminology, 
I touched base with some ex-colleagues (now in their 
senior University posts). Some concerns have already 
been mentioned. I was also told that intellectual collabo-
ration had weakened somewhat, as in-house researchers 
do less in the way of conducting their own research than 
simply managing the work of others (although austerity 
has meant that there is less to be managed). There was 
some concern about the research procurement process; 
so too about the handling of research results, which Mor-
gan and Hough (2007) kindly describe as a process of 
‘traffic calming’. My informants seem to have got used to 
the fact that to pursue any broader-based, thematic ideas 
of their own they need to look for funds elsewhere than 
from government. (Fortunately, other sources of funding 
have emerged, principally from charitable foundations 
and trusts.) They accept that the Home Office now only 
calls for research around centrally driven policy con-
cerns. And not least because of funding pressures, many 
academics in universities and criminological centres are 
still willing to supply this, and to work co-operatively 
with in-house researchers. A reflection of this is the 
recent establishment of the What Works Centre for Crime 
Reduction, hosted by the College of Policing, which sees 
researchers both inside government and in contributing 
together.15
So, to conclude, I have defended administrative crimi-
nology because I felt it needed someone to stand up 
for it. I have presented two negative guises of it: one 
when it was only seen as concerned with SCP; the other 
more recent one when it was characterised as unim-
aginative fact-gathering, or narrow, short-termist policy 
evaluations which needed to come up with acceptable 
conclusions. I presented my own interpretation of what 
administrative criminology should be seen as: essentially 
research specifically geared to serving policy purposes, 
but which also provides expensive empirical building 
blocks such as victimisation and offending surveys, as 
well as “administrative” statistical information on—for 
instance—what crimes the police know about, who is 
captured by the criminal justice system and how it deals 
with them.
I believe that administrative criminology needs to 
be seen in a positive light. It would be rash to say that 
all administrative criminology is of a consistently high 
quality—but there is plenty of quality variation in other 
modes of criminology too. It is also difficult to contend 
that administrative criminology has made much head-
way in quantifying and describing ‘big business’ fraud, 
environmental crime, or corporate crime—although 
very few criminologist working in less of a political 
straight jacket have done so either. Nonetheless, I see the 
work done within the Home Office until I retired from 
it in 2004 as being influential, and I would like to think 
that the same holds for the output of equivalent research 
facilities in other countries. I could not see a problem 
when administrative criminology was associated sim-
ply with SCP. This was intellectually grounded, and 
has become an accepted part of the armoury of meas-
ures for reducing crime. (The ‘crime drop’, no less, has 
been attributed by some as mainly due to the increase in 
15 The Centre is co-funded by the Economic and Social Research Centre. 
It sets out to: (i) review research on practices and interventions to reduce 
crime; (ii) label the evidence base in terms of quality, cost and impact; and 
(iii) provide Police and Crime Commissioners and other crime reduction 
stakeholders with the knowledge, tools and guidance to help them target 
their resources effectively. The work is being done by the College and a con-
sortium of eight universities, led by University College London.
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security that SCP championed—e.g., Farrell et al. 2014). 
Of course, others are fully within their rights to pursue 
other avenues for explaining crime and dealing with it. I 
understand that we are meant to have a balanced portfo-
lio of investments, and it is hard to argue against the case 
for criminological pluralism and respect for intellectual 
differences (cf. Currie 2007; Mears 2010). It is also hard 
to argue  that administrative criminology should have 
to shoulder the burden of developing criminology as an 
academic discipline.
When administrative criminology became just aligned 
with doing mainly evaluative research within or for gov-
ernment to their agenda, I did not have much of a prob-
lem either. It is entirely reasonable for government to 
want to know how their policies fare. And even if the 
evidence governments want is sometimes mis-specified, 
overly narrow, or not in the end properly heeded (which 
may be often the case), I do not think that absolves crimi-
nologists from trying to speak truth to power. Moreover, 
one never knows: administrative criminologists working 
with government may have a more effective voice than 
those who simply choose to shout at the side lines.
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